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Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat 
Bill Tallen 
At 0830 on an otherwise normal autumn morning, a wave of violence erupts without 
warning at locations across the American heartland, targeting schools and 
schoolchildren. Improvised explosives detonate in sidewalk trash bins; school buses 
are bombed; lone snipers target campuses and first responders in hit and run attacks. 
As confusion and panic spread from local venues to the national consciousness via the 
twenty-four-hour news media, a band of armed terrorists take over an elementary 
school in a small Midwestern city. City and county SWAT officers respond to the scene 
before the scope of the event is clear; trained to respond to a Columbine-like active-
shooter incident, they stage a hasty assault which is bloodily repulsed.  
Executing a score of adult hostages as evidence of their resolve, the terrorists then 
herd hundreds of schoolchildren and staff into the school gymnasium, which they 
prepare with explosives. They upload images of their action onto the Internet. Their 
postings identify the perpetrators as al Qa’ida-affiliated jihadists. Intelligence from the 
police perimeter indicates thirty or more fighters, with military small arms, explosives, 
and heavy weapons, rapidly improving their defenses. 
The terrorists announce their intention to execute their hostages, and their 
willingness to accept ‘martyrdom,’ in the event of another assault or if the U.S. 
government does not take immediate steps to meet their single, non-negotiable 
demand: withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the rest of the House of Islam. 
 
The scenario above is loosely based on the seizure of Beslan School #1 in the Russian 
republic of North Ossetia in 2004, where over a thousand hostages were taken, and 
hundreds of schoolchildren and other innocents were ultimately killed by Chechen 
terrorists.1 This attack was conducted by terrorists using conventional weapons and 
tactics, and required technical expertise less challenging and far more common than the 
piloting skills that guided commercial jets into American buildings on September 11, 
2001.     
The Beslan siege lasted three days before ending in massive bloodshed during an 
assault by government forces – very unlike the instantaneous effects and protracted 
aftermath that characterize suicide terrorism. The attackers took physical control of 
high value assets (for what assets are more valuable, in both real and symbolic terms, 
than our children?), exploited their act for propaganda value, assaulted and murdered 
hostages throughout the siege, and threatened yet worse consequences if their 
impossible demands were not met by the Russian government. Although we can only 
speculate regarding their ultimate intent, which was pre-empted by the government 
forces’ emergency assault, the final outcome in Beslan was terrible enough. 
Related scenarios in a U.S. setting are not difficult to construct, applying similar 
means of attack against a range of soft targets of great iconic, political, or economic 
value. Attacks on better-protected targets such as nuclear power plants, nuclear 
materials shipments, or seats of government are generally considered less likely, 
although surveillance and reconnaissance are known to occur, and some of these harder 
TALLEN, PARAMILITARY TERRORISM 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
2 
targets may actually be more vulnerable to seizure and exploitation by paramilitary 
forces than they are to suicide terrorism.    
From the standpoint of preparedness and response planning, such scenarios bear 
little resemblance to the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios that command 
so much of our national attention. Assaults by armed groups, employing improvised 
explosive devices (IED) as enablers or force multipliers rather than the primary 
mechanisms of attack, are commonplace tactics of terrorists and insurgents worldwide. 
By contrast, effective WMD attacks, no matter how theoretically attractive to terrorists, 
and how extreme their potential consequences, remain so far the stuff of fiction. While 
paramilitary attacks may not offer first-order effects (casualties and physical damage) 
equivalent to those of large-scale WMD, their psychological and strategic impact – and 
thus their appeal as quintessential acts of terror – may be enormous.2 
WMD terrorism against U.S. targets may be less likely than more conventional forms 
of attack. Preparedness and defense against terrorism is a risk-management exercise, 
and the calculus of likelihood versus consequence – of most dangerous versus most 
likely – will be ignored at our great peril. The threat of WMD terrorism has led logically 
to a heavy emphasis on prevention by the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities.  But in the event that prevention fails, WMD terrorism scenarios leave 
little scope for intervention, as the execution phase would likely be brief and spectacular. 
For this reason, policy efforts and the allocation of resources have focused heavily upon 
consequence management and forensics. This tendency is further reinforced by 
America’s recent experience of natural and man-made catastrophes (e.g. Hurricane 
Katrina and the California fires of 2007), and the structures and processes of 
consequence management address both terror and non-terror scenarios. The fixation of 
official attention and resources upon WMD terrorism, and upon consequence 
management more generally, has left America ill-prepared to respond quickly and 
effectively to a terrorist paramilitary attack, which may be far more likely than an 
apocalyptic WMD scenario. Measures should be taken to narrow this gap in 
preparedness before it can be exploited by our intelligent, opportunistic enemies. 
LIKE A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS 
Although there is informed debate over the attractiveness of WMD to al Qa’ida and its 
jihadist affiliates, the specter of WMD attack has led U.S. homeland security policy, 
planning, organization, and operations to concentrate overwhelmingly on either 
preventing or mitigating the consequences of such attacks. 3  The technical, law 
enforcement, and intelligence challenges of prevention, and the massive costs and 
organizational requirements of consequence management, have dominated the 
attention, efforts, and assets of the interagency community charged with homeland 
security. The national trauma of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 diverted official attention 
from terrorism as a causative agent, but reinforced the fixation on consequence 
management. Agencies charged with response to domestic terrorism are largely the 
same that have been mandated, since Katrina, to better prepare for the aftermath of 
future natural disasters. 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought a sense of urgency to U.S. 
counterterrorist (CT) planning, a large body of official policy and doctrine has emerged. 
While successive generations of guidance show increasing sophistication in many areas, 
they are quite consistent in ignoring modalities of terrorist attack other than WMD, 
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isolated IEDs, and suicide terrorism. The two latter categories receive minimal attention, 
and in any case they share a salient characteristic of WMD attacks: we either prevent 
them or clean up and investigate in the aftermath. A selective review of the literature 
provides illustrative examples. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) in 2003 provided course 
corrections and guidance for most subsequent efforts in the field of federal emergency 
preparedness. It called for a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to guide the 
response to domestic incidents “regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”4 It required 
the development of a national response plan to “integrate Federal Government domestic 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-
hazards plan.” 5  Significantly, it directed that crisis management and consequence 
management, previously treated as separate yet related functions, be approached 
henceforth as an integrated whole.6 Conflating terrorist attacks with natural or other 
manmade disasters, and failing to differentiate response to an ongoing incident from 
mitigation of its after-effects, HSPD-5 set the tone for future policy and planning. 
The National Response Plan (NRP) was first promulgated in 2004, was later revised 
to address shortfalls identified in the Hurricane Katrina response, and is now being 
supplanted by the National Response Framework (NRF).7 Both documents consistently 
profile the terrorist threat as a nexus of suicide terrorism and WMD – 9/11 writ large – 
reflecting an already pervasive, and entirely logical, emphasis on prevention as the first 
line of defense. They pay scant attention to resolving an ongoing crisis of a non-WMD 
nature, in the event that prevention fails. Both the NRP and NRF are devoted primarily 
to consequence management, either of WMD attacks or natural disasters.  
The lack of attention paid to resolution of an ongoing terrorist incident is also evident 
in the National Planning Scenarios, designed to provide focus for exercises and 
contingency planning by all levels of government.8 These fifteen scenarios include two 
natural disasters, an outbreak of pandemic influenza, and twelve terrorist attacks: one 
improvised nuclear detonation, one radiological dispersion device, four biological and 
four chemical attacks, one cyber, one radiological, and one attack using multiple 
conventional explosives. In several scenarios, terrorists conduct multiple simultaneous 
or closely sequenced attacks, at varying distances from one another. Effects, especially 
in the biological and radiological attack scenarios, are spread over time depending on 
levels of transmissibility or exposure, but attack execution is essentially instantaneous, 
and the scope of government response is limited to consequence management and 
criminal investigation in the aftermath.9 Nowhere in the National Planning Scenarios is 
there a requirement for a tactical response to resolve an ongoing situation or disrupt 
terrorist actions in progress.  
With only rare exceptions, other DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
guidance describe a terrorist threat based primarily on mass-casualty WMD attacks.10 
While the threat of terrorist use of IEDs on a less apocalyptic scale is gaining traction in 
recent guidance, attention is still directed overwhelmingly to either prevention or post-
attack measures.11  
Nothing in this argument is meant to denigrate the importance of criminal 
investigation in the aftermath of an attack, nor of the substantial and thus far successful 
efforts of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to prevent major acts of 
domestic terrorism. While these are important and worthy efforts, a fixation upon WMD 
terrorism has combined with the recurring national experience of other manmade or 
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natural disasters to focus planning efforts and resources to a dangerous degree on the 
challenges of prevention, investigation, and consequence management. When 
deterrence, detection, and prevention fail, we will face enemies that must be engaged 
and defeated – missions with a very different set of requirements.   
COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Unity of command and clearly defined command and support relationships, across a 
wide spectrum of responding agencies, would be essential in the event of a time-
sensitive and ongoing terrorist incident. The NRF and other national response guidance 
offer an architecture for command and control (C2) that could well prove cumbersome, 
confusing, and unresponsive in such a crisis, however sensitive it may be to political and 
statutory relationships, and however workable under the less constrained timelines of 
disaster response or consequence management. 
A terrorist incident beyond the response capabilities of local and state government – 
which a Beslan-like attack would certainly be – would trigger requests for federal 
assistance and invoke federal guidance identifying the Department of Justice, and more 
specifically the FBI, as lead federal agency. The water is muddied somewhat by the 
designation of the Department of Homeland Security as lead agency for coordination of 
incident response generally, across all levels of government.12 It is made no clearer by 
DOD’s status as lead agency for homeland defense: the seam separating homeland 
defense from homeland security is not well defined, particularly in the context of an 
ongoing attack by foreign-based terrorists.13    
Planning guidance identifies these seams and ambiguities as strengths, which they 
might well be, if national decision makers have the time and situational awareness to 
capitalize on the flexibility and adaptability of a vaguely defined system, tailoring it to 
the exigencies of the moment.14 In the critical early stages of a terrorist incident this 
ambiguity may instead challenge the nation’s ability to produce a coordinated, effective 
response.  
Critical real-time intelligence, requests and authorizations for assistance, deployment 
orders, and assignment of command responsibility must flow through the “wiring 
diagrams” of NIMS among local agencies and three federal departments (DHS, DOJ, 
and DOD) with overlapping responsibilities, and then to their component agencies, 
services, and commands. It may be a gross understatement to suggest that this may not 
occur smoothly in the early hours of a crisis. 
A Request for Assistance (RFA) by military forces, for instance, can originate from a 
state governor’s office, or from a federal agency on scene. It will travel through federal 
law enforcement channels to the attorney general, from there to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for approval, and then to U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), which only then receives operational control of active duty forces 
from other combatant commands.15 If the forces allocated for response include National 
Guard – which would likely be mobilizing simultaneously under state authority – 
further coordination of their status and chain of command will be necessary. There are 
ample opportunities in this process for confusion and delay, which could have 
particularly (and literally) fatal consequences in an ongoing terrorist incident of the type 
anticipated here.16 
NIMS and the Incident Command System promote the concept of Unified Command, 
a tool for consensus decision-making that can help defuse conflict and integrate civilian 
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agencies with overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions.17 Military forces, however, 
do not operate under the Unified Command structure at all, and each civilian agency, 
while participating, maintains a separate chain of command for its own forces, so 
Unified Command at best provides only unity of effort.  
Under the conditions of ambiguity, overlapping responsibilities, compressed 
timelines, and cascading consequences that will prevail in the event of an ongoing 
terrorist attack, mission success will require high levels of coordination, shared 
assumptions, and good will among a multitude of agencies unaccustomed to 
cooperation in a crisis. Higher echelons and tactical responders alike will require true 
unity of command, but there is no construct in NIMS that will enable it.  
The NIMS command structure has proven useful, or at least usable, in the 
consequence management scenarios for which it was primarily designed. When rapid, 
forceful, coordinated tactical response is required to resolve an ongoing terrorist action, 
convoluted routing of requests for assistance, parallel chains of command, and the 
consensus decision making of Unified Command will likely fall short of the need. 
TIME, SPACE, AND FORCE 
One lesson starkly evident in the aftermath of Beslan is that tactical response to such an 
incident requires discipline, proficiency, and precision. To deny an adversary time to 
consolidate his position, cause further damage or loss of life, or exploit the propaganda 
value of his action, the response must also be swift – measured in hours, not days. Rapid 
deployment of tactical forces capable of resolving the situation is therefore vital.18 
Local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) would respond quickly, but in most cases 
lack the ability to defeat numerous, well-prepared adversaries like those that attacked 
Beslan in 2004.19 Hostage rescue or asset recovery on the scale envisioned by this 
scenario is beyond the capability of most LLEA SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) 
teams.20 Most local and state agencies field teams composed of patrol officers, who 
receive additional specialized training and equipment, but train and operate as a team 
only on an occasional basis, and require time to assemble and orient to a crisis situation. 
These teams seldom consist of more than a dozen assaulters, with varying degrees of 
support by snipers, breachers, and other specialists.21 Some departments do field full-
time, well-equipped and highly proficient SWAT teams that can respond quickly and in 
strength to local incidents with a high level of cohesion and tactical proficiency. But even 
these teams would be challenged by the paradigm shift involved in confronting 
paramilitary terrorism. Whether full-time or part-time, LLEA SWAT teams quite 
understandably tend to focus their resources and training time on the scenarios they 
most frequently confront, such as high risk warrant service, active shooters, and 
barricaded suspects.   
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and rules for the use of force which are 
suitable, legal, and constitutionally defensible for these situations, are often dangerously 
incompatible with the requirements of combat against multiple, dedicated, heavily 
armed and fortified terrorists.22 For instance, the 1999 Columbine school shootings 
showed the inadequacy of the common SWAT practice of containment, intelligence 
gathering, negotiation, and deliberate assault planning when faced with an active 
shooter scenario. Training for such incidents now often stresses the necessity for rapid 
intervention by small elements at the earliest possible moment. While this may be a 
realistic and necessary response to a rampage by one or two criminal sociopaths, it 
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would fail catastrophically, and could easily provoke a hugely disproportionate response, 
if the attackers were an organized paramilitary group. The Beslan-like paramilitary 
terrorism scenario is most emphatically not a typical SWAT incident, and will not be 
resolved by the methods and resources available to local law enforcement. 
The FBI represents the next echelon of response, but it is unlikely that the Bureau 
could quickly field a tactical capability commensurate with its authority. Its field offices 
in fifty-six U.S. cities can mobilize SWAT teams composed of special agents who 
volunteer for this ancillary duty and receive appropriate specialized training. Team size 
varies, and at the larger field offices may include as many as twenty agents, organized 
into sniper teams, breachers, and assaulters. As with most LLEA teams, however, FBI 
SWAT team personnel have other primary duties and are seldom afforded the 
opportunity to train together as a tactical team more than a few days a month. A larger 
regional SWAT team can be assembled from these field office elements, but assembly 
alone could require days, and a composite regional team is even less likely to be capable 
of fully-integrated tactical operations without yet more time for training and rehearsal. 
Although they have proven adequate for most of the federal law enforcement 
contingencies for which they were created, FBI SWAT teams may offer only a limited 
enhancement of local capabilities in time-sensitive terrorism scenarios.23  
 The FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), the tactical component of its Critical 
Incident Response Group, is a large, full-time tactical team – a highly capable, Tier One 
national asset – but its ability to respond effectively to paramilitary terrorism is subject 
to the tyrannies of time, space, and force. Without specific prior warning of an imminent 
attack, it would not be deployed forward from its base in Virginia. It could therefore 
require many hours of air and surface travel to be mission ready at an incident site, 
particularly one in the central or western United States, even after the processing of a 
request for assistance and HRT receipt of alert and deployment orders. The HRT lacks 
sufficient strength and redundancy in both operators and in its command, planning, 
support, and transportation capabilities, to respond to multiple attacks or diversions in 
dispersed locations, a requirement it might well face in the event of a well-planned 
terrorist attack.24    
Other federal agencies possess tactical teams with varying degrees of proficiency and 
availability, but these are mostly relatively small, part-time, ad hoc units like the FBI 
SWAT teams. They are neither trained nor held in readiness for quick response or for 
missions outside their agencies’ normal jurisdictions and operational profiles. 
Designated military Quick Response Forces (QRF), as well as the tactical teams of 
installation security forces, can provide support to civil authorities, given either 
completion of the RFA process described earlier, or a local commander’s determination 
that immediate response on his own authority is necessary. Few of these forces, however, 
are properly trained or equipped for counterterrorist operations, and they would 
introduce additional interoperability and chain-of-command issues to offset any 
incremental advantage they offer, beyond assistance in perimeter control and other 
supporting roles.  
A few DOD special operations forces (SOF) possess robust counterterrorist 
capabilities, but their ability to respond effectively to domestic incidents of paramilitary 
terrorism would be constrained by deployment time, distance, and force size in much 
the same way as the HRT. The demands of wartime operations overseas further limit the 
availability and readiness of these military assets. Forces tasked with domestic civil 
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support in terrorism contingencies are unlikely to be fully dedicated to training and 
preparation for that mission, carrying it instead as an ancillary responsibility during 
periods of reconstitution, while rotated stateside out of combat zone deployments. 
The Posse Comitatus Act or PCA (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385) limits direct 
involvement of most Title 10 (active duty) military forces in domestic law enforcement.25 
The extent to which it restricts the utility of military assets in domestic CT roles is by no 
means resolved. As noted earlier, the seam between homeland security – where civilian 
agencies lead and counterterrorism is seen as a law enforcement function – and 
homeland defense missions – where DOD leads and possesses considerable freedom of 
action – is imprecise and largely untested by real world applications. Some DOD 
guidance claims that statutory exceptions to PCA, or direct presidential authorization, 
will result in minimal restriction on its forces’ freedom to assist law enforcement even 
during civil support missions. Other guidance is less sanguine, and the boundaries and 
authorities are not portrayed consistently.26    
Academic studies, as well as common perceptions among civil authorities and even 
within the DOD community, reflect the same ambivalence displayed in DOD guidance.27  
Readiness of local authorities or lead federal agencies to request DOD tactical assets, to 
integrate them rapidly and effectively, and to entrust them with local command of 
tactical operations would require a remarkable and apparently not universal degree of 
confidence in the legal basis for their participation. It would also require a willingness to 
renounce jurisdictional authority and organizational rivalry and distrust.  
Military CT teams in a domestic role would find themselves in an operating 
environment very unlike those that pertain to most overseas war-fighting missions. 
While their training and operational methods would in many respects be better suited to 
the requirements of the situation than those of domestic law enforcement agencies, legal 
and constitutional restraints will intrude. They would be called upon to work in close 
cooperation, on compressed timelines, with civilian agencies that do not share their 
doctrine, equipment, TTP, or C2 structure and methods.  
Conflicts over jurisdiction, responsibility, and capacity among responding local 
agencies, the FBI, and military assets are a form of friction that must be expected – 
particularly in the absence of frequent joint and interagency tactical response exercises 
involving critical stakeholders. These stakeholders include LLEA nationwide – not just 
in a few high-profile “showcase” locations – as well as all FBI field offices, the National 
Guard of every state, and the full range of Title 10 (active duty military) forces discussed 
earlier.28     
In summary, tactical teams that could respond effectively to a terrorist paramilitary 
threat within the United States are limited in number, size, interoperability, and the 
speed with which they could respond to many potential incident sites. They would be 
hard-pressed to respond to multiple simultaneous or closely sequenced contingencies – 
a limitation that could be exploited by an adversary’s use of diversions or secondary 
efforts. Their ability to coordinate their actions with supporting agencies in a hostage 
rescue or asset recovery mission against significant opposition, in a domestic 
environment, remains largely untested. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The foregoing discussion has identified three gaps in the nation’s preparedness to meet 
a paramilitary terrorist attack on U.S. soil: inattention to the threat in scenarios, 
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exercises, and guidance that drive training and preparation at all levels of government; 
limited availability and slow deployment times of capable CT units; and the 
unwieldiness of the command and control structure which would authorize and 
coordinate their employment. In the context of an ongoing competition for time, 
resources, and attention several recommendations are offered.  
Great returns could be achieved from a modest investment, by reorienting the 
considerable efforts of the homeland security community to an approach more inclusive 
of the full range of terrorist threats. Even without major force structure, funding, or top-
down C2 and doctrinal changes (although all of these may ultimately be necessary), the 
gaps in preparedness may be narrowed considerably. Simply widening the focus of 
exercises to include paramilitary terrorist attack scenarios would highlight areas 
requiring policy attention, identify work-arounds, and prepare key decision makers for 
their roles in this type of situation. Proper critiques of such exercises, and wide, effective 
dissemination of lessons learned to agencies at all levels from local police to DHS, DOD, 
and DOJ would be critical, and are the most often neglected part of the training process. 
After-action reviews must be brutally honest, fully documented, and devoid of blame. 
Participants must set aside egos, as well as interagency rivalries, and welcome the use of 
their failures – along with their successes – to educate their counterparts nationwide.  
Three more components of a likely solution emerge from the preceding analysis. 
Implementation will require careful consideration of where the domestic 
counterterrorist mission should reside, but should be shaped by the following 
assumptions: 
• Dedicated, full-time federal counterterrorist units without routine law 
enforcement duties or orientation can best provide the key tactical competencies 
required to resolve an ongoing incident.  
• Streamlined command and control, cutting the Gordian Knot of the NRF 
authorization process, could promise rapid commitment of CT units in a crisis.  
• Regional basing could drastically reduce deployment time to all parts of the 
country, compared to the current reliance on centralized assets located on the 
coasts, while also promoting area familiarity and interoperability with local, state, 
and other federal agencies in each region. 
A Military Solution 
Existing studies of the DOD role in homeland security, much like the official literature, 
focus primarily on support to civil authorities in natural or manmade disasters, and on 
WMD terrorism scenarios. Certain of their recommendations could nonetheless 
contribute to improving counterterrorist capabilities. These include the constitution of 
standing, regionally-based response units with a primary civil support mission, each 
based on an Army Brigade Combat Team or a Marine Air Ground Task Force, 
substantially augmented with specialties such as Military Police, Engineers, and Civil 
Affairs from both active and reserve components. To address the deficiency in CT 
capabilities posed by this analysis, they might also include dedicated CT teams drawn 
from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). One study suggests a total of 
three of these reinforced brigades.29 Another more ambitiously proposes one for each of 
the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.30   
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Both studies conceive of these response forces as full-time, federally funded Title 10 
forces, assigned to USNORTHCOM. Under the current system, USNORTHCOM only 
receives operational control over active and reserve component formations during a 
crisis, in response to a Request for Assistance. While active duty forces assigned 
permanently to USNORTHCOM could presumably respond more quickly once 
committed, processing the RFA through civilian interagency channels could still delay 
their commitment, despite their relative proximity to an incident site and their 
simplified chain of command. 
Issues relating to Title 10 versus state active duty or Title 32 status for National 
Guard components of the proposed regional response forces are not particularly 
relevant for their counterterrorist components. Maintenance of proficiency in complex 
perishable skills and the requirement for swift deployment in a crisis both argue for full-
time, Title 10 active duty status for the CT teams. For Title 10 forces, however, the 
ambiguity discussed earlier concerning legal authority – is the mission homeland 
defense or support to civilian law enforcement – would still beg resolution.  
The advantages in response time gained from regional basing would be somewhat 
offset by the difficulties of ensuring consistent, high quality training and support for 
dispersed SOF elements no longer centrally based or assigned to USSOCOM. Regional 
reproduction of the training facilities and infrastructure of USSOCOM is unlikely, 
suggesting either reduced opportunities for training or regular travel out of region to 
training sites. Team size would have to be large enough to maintain a capable, 
responsive element on call for crisis deployments, while accommodating training and 
administrative requirements. These would not be small teams. 
Reliance on DOD for improved domestic CT capabilities would also require: funding 
for further expansion of SOF, in order to avoid a negative impact on war fighting 
capabilities and commitments; fencing these units from diversion to other missions; 
time to identify and assign cadre, and then to recruit, train, and attain operational 
capability for new CT teams; and finding or improving appropriate basing facilities with 
ready access to air and ground transportation covering the assigned region. These 
requirements would also pertain more broadly to the larger project of standing up 
brigade-size regional response forces, and could introduce significant delays in 
implementation.  
A Civil Approach 
A better solution to this problem may be found in an expansion and redeployment of 
existing FBI counterterrorist capabilities. The existing HRT offers a model for an 
expanded, regionally-based federal CT force. Depending on how regional boundaries 
were drawn, two or three “cloned” teams resembling the HRT in strength and 
organization would constitute a significant improvement in capabilities and 
responsiveness, for a relatively modest investment in 200-300 additional special agents 
(plus administrative and support echelons as required). New teams could be built on 
cadre recruited from field office SWAT teams and the existing HRT, and augmented as 
necessary from those sources until additional recruitment and training filled their ranks. 
If these teams were dedicated to the counterterrorist mission, and not utilized in other 
law enforcement functions, recruiting would not be limited to experienced special 
agents but could seek outside talent; and their training, rules of engagement, and TTP 
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could reflect the dire and unique circumstances of combat against paramilitary 
terrorists in a domestic operating environment. 
Given the FBI’s existing authority as lead federal agency for response to domestic 
terrorism, regional CT teams under its direct control would offer a simplified C2 
structure and minimize jurisdictional ambiguity and the frictions attendant to multi-
agency operations. They would relieve DOD special operations forces of responsibility 
for domestic CT missions in all but the gravest circumstances.  
Such an expansion of agent end-strength, and the necessary support staff and 
infrastructure, would require a significant increase in FBI budget, but not a 
disproportionate one in the context of other ongoing increases in federal law 
enforcement manning and capability (for instance in the effort to improve border 
protection). Shifting current efforts or personnel without expanding end-strength, 
beyond the use of existing technical expertise and tactical leadership for cadre, could 
only damage the Bureau’s ability to conduct other vital tasks. Rather than a diversion of 
resources from other efforts, this should be undertaken as a necessary increase in the 
nation’s investment in security from terrorist threats. 
CONCLUSION 
In the gap between prevention (where we stake many of our hopes and count many 
successes) and consequence management (where we currently devote a preponderance 
of our resources) lies the risk of a technically unsophisticated  paramilitary attack on 
assets we are not prepared to lose, and which might offer tremendous leverage to a 
ruthless and dedicated adversary. It may be time to heed our own counsel, as stated in 
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism: 
Terrorists choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe 
in our defenses and in our preparations. They can balance the difficulty in 
successfully executing a particular attack against the magnitude of loss it might 
cause. They can monitor our media and listen to our policymakers as our Nation 
discusses how to protect itself - and adjust their plans accordingly. Where we 
insulate ourselves from one form of attack, they can shift and focus on another 
exposed vulnerability. We must defend ourselves against a wide range of means 
and methods of attack.31 
Political, legal, and budgetary considerations will continue to bound the art of the 
possible; there can be no perfect or impenetrable defense. Prioritization of threats to 
homeland security will remain a calculus of probability and consequence; but the threat 
we neglect may well prove to be the one most appealing to the adversary. 
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